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D I L E M M A S  OF SCIENCE AND CONSCIENCE 
T has been a happy arrangement of Nature in the timing I of man's mental development that when his powers were 
feeblest, and the odds against his survival greatest, he seems 
to have been least worried about his own future. And this 
primitive self-confidence, born of ignorance and faith, must 
have been a factor in lifting him out of the economic cockpit. 
T h e  same is true of his mental problems : the hardest among 
these have been the latest to  make themselves felt. 
Take  for example the problem of language. Language is 
a magazine of signs, for the most part, in early time, of 
vocal signs for non-vocal meanings. Vocal noises are good 
materials for such signs because they are under immediate, 
voluntary control, and can be perceived in the dark and 
around corners. Most  human tribes use gestures to  help 
out their vocal signs, but no human tribe makes the gesture- 
language primary. But of course not all sounds are signs, 
not even all vocal sounds. Every human being has had to  
distinguish between the sounds that are signs and those 
which are just noises! Imagine the embarrassment of a 
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human mother i f  she had in some way to explain to her in- 
fant this distinction: “ M y  dear child, sounds are of two 
kinds . . . etc.” If language had to  be used to get language 
started, we should never have emerged from this circle. 
Fortunately the problem was unfelt. I t  is only today that 
the full force of the difficulties of theory in the everyday 
use of language are dawning on us: we realize with horror 
that no child has ever had the primitive and all important 
words explained to him ! 
T h e  same situation exists in the problem to  which I am 
inviting your attention, the problem of value. Until very 
recently there has been no such problem, for we have simply 
taken the answers for granted; and this happy state of in- 
nocence has served practical purposes very well. I t  is, 
roughly speaking, the problem of the relation between what 
we want and what exists. Science is a t  hand to  tell us what 
exists, not what we want. W e  are supposed t o  know whit  
we want, and science then becomes the most systematic and 
effective magazine of knowledge pertinent to our getting 
what we want. Science is the repertory upon which tech- 
nology draws. Science is an independent pursuit: its business 
is to master nature intellectually, to  understand how the 
vast system operates and to  enjoy that understanding. T h e  
freer science is the more likely it is to serve technical in- 
terests. In the great research laboratory a t  Schenectady 
it has been the tradition that men engaged there have been 
explicitly given free rein to do  their investigating without 
regard for usable results. But the assumption of the whole 
effort, scientific and technological, is that we men know 
what we want. In other words, the problem of “values” 
has not been a conscious problem. 
One evidence of this is that the very word “value” is a 
new word in the sense in which it is now usual to  employ it. 
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I t  is common and ancient enough in its commercial and quasi- 
commercial uses. W e  know the value of the goods we buy, 
if we are prudent buyers. Every man who works for  his 
wage o r  his salary is concerned to know what value is placed 
on his services. And quite apart  from income a man desires 
to know how he is esteemed, that is, what his value is in the 
eyes of his community. T h e  value of a man or of a thing 
is its valoir, its strength o r  power, its utility, how much it 
can achieve or command, its validity. 
W e  come a t  once upon a wider use when we consider a 
problem of which education has only recently begun to take 
the measure, that of giving a student a just sense of “values.” 
This includes a wise judgment of quality among the goods on 
the market, but it goes beyond that to a judgment of the 
things worth pursuing, of what have been called the “ends” 
of life. Education in America has been highly useful: we 
have been supplying our students with the fundamental tech- 
niques and with highly competent information about the 
means to attain their ends. In all this we have been taking 
for granted that they too know what they want, know what 
ends they intend to  pursue, know the relative values of these 
ends. W e  are only now awakening to the fact that the knowl- 
edge of the values of ends is what the ancients called “wis- 
dom”;  and that we have been assuming either that wisdom 
of this sort is a kind of instinctive gift of the species o r  that 
every student will pick it up in the course of his growth, if 
he has a good home and good company. T h e  extreme diffi- 
culty of the problem of teaching values is striking us now 
with full force. 
But the term “value” has taken a further step of gen- 
eralization. I t  now includes economic values, moral values, 
aesthetic values, truth values, as well as the elements of 
value in the simple pleasures, goods, and activities of the 
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day’s program. Why  is its meaning so broadened? I confess 
that in this wide scope it has become almost unmanageable. 
I t  includes so much that it has become vague and slippery. 
But there is a reason, namely, that it has come to  stand for 
a deep-going contrast. T h e  world is seen to have two aspects, 
the aspect of fact and the aspect of value. T h e  term “value” 
has to  spread itself to  accommodate everything that is not 
pure fact, everything that has color, interest, meaning, qual- 
ity. T h e  word “fact” then has to purify itself of all elements 
of preference o r  feeling in order to  hold its strict objective 
and solid character. T h e  work of the jury, as distinct from 
the work of the judge, was once defined on the basis of this 
distinction: the jury was to determine the facts, the judge 
was to  estimate the meaning of the facts and attach the due 
penalty; the judge was the evaluating officer. But although 
this line has been all but obliterated in judicial procedure, it 
remains in some of our more recent divisions of the process 
of enquiry. W e  have our Fact Finding Commissions, whose 
work is preliminary to our Commissions of Appraisal. I t  is 
assumed that the facts can be determined in abstraction from 
any commitment as to their worth. This, of course, is not 
strictly the case; for the fact-finders only know what facts 
to  collect, if they have some idea what they mean. In his- 
torical and social matters, one might go so fa r  as to say, 
there is no such collection as “the facts,” first because the 
items that might be assembled are infinite in number, and 
second because we can never find a social fact except through 
the mouth and eye of some person who has an opinion 
about it. In traveling through the Near  Eas t  some years 
ago, I attempted to  get a t  certain facts about the French 
administration of Syria : but one Frenchman who sincerely 
tried to  help me said a t  the end of a long series of questions : 
“You must remember the saying, which applies with espe- 
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cia1 force to  everything in the East, ‘Ici il n’y a pas des 
faits, il n’y a que des versions.’ ” Every so-called fact is an 
interpretation. T h e  difference of function remains, for the 
same data will provoke different judgments according to  
the standards of value of the appraisers. For  instance, if  you 
tell me that our state spends fifty million dollars a year on 
higher education and produces just one man per year of first- 
rate powers of leadership, I have to say that this fact by itself 
does not condemn our education; or if you say that the di- 
vorce-rate has increased three hundred per cent in a quarter 
century in America, I have to say that these facts, if  they are 
facts, do  not of themselves show that marriage is a failure. 
You recite the facts as though they settled a question of 
worth: but the two operations of determining facts and de- 
termining values retain a degree of independence. 
T h e  pertinence of this distinction to our present theme 
lies in the circumstance that science has traditionally taken 
the field of fact for its province and has left the field of 
value to  other agencies. This division of labor has been to 
some extent deliberate on the part  of science and for very 
good reasons, but its full import has only recently dawned 
on us because of this slow development in the concept of 
value and of the problems connected with it. 
I. MEANING OF THE TERM “VALUE” 
One of the good reasons for the disposition of science to  
keep clear of value is the lack of precision in the generalized 
notion of value. I t  is so difficult to  define that it has been 
judged an indefinable. Perhaps the best definition is the nega- 
tive one we have already used: value is not fact, fact is not 
value. 
If we were to  undertake a positive account, we should be 
likely to  find ourselves working in a circle: a value is that 
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character of being or experience which requires to be esti- 
mated in terms of its worth. This  is a definition which anyone 
will understand i f  he already knows what worth and value 
are, not otherwise: yet we might invite anyone to  do better. 
Shall we say that value is that whose absence would leave 
the world neutral, devoid of interest, wholly indifferent ? 
Or that value is that which polarizes the whole world of ex- 
perience into the welcome and the unwelcome, the agreeable 
and disagreeable, the attractive and the repulsive the good 
and the evil, and thus banishes all indifference? Or that 
value is everything that lends quality and therefore calls 
for preference in the world; everything that makes the world 
a region in which beings with wills can exist, beings having 
to  choose and act, for without value there would be no con- 
ceivable ground for choice or action, there would be no 
better course and no worse course, no wisdom and no folly? 
These statements are true ; they do not amount to  definitions ; 
they merely help us to  locate what we mean by value by 
giving it a context. 
If we attempt to  make the context the nub of a definition, 
and say that value is the object of preference, o r  of emotion, 
or with my colleague Professor Ralph Perry, of any interest, 
this would be putting second things first: we are moved by 
value because it is value; it is not a value because we feel 
emotion toward it. Otherwise our feelings and interests 
would determine what values are, and there would be no 
appeal from our preference. Since there can be an appeal 
from my taste, or even from my type of conscience, the final 
and determining point of value cannot be in my mode of 
response. But this is perhaps as near to a definition as we 
are likely to  come, or need to  come for the purposes of our 
own argument: value is that  aspect of the world which ap- 
pears when there are wills about, that  is to  say, minds with 
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choices to  effect and decisions to  make. I t  stands in contrast 
to  the purely theoretical aspect of the world; though for  
conscious beings the two are inseparable. Every sensation we 
experience is colored to some extent by the qualitative touch 
of the agreeable or disagreeable, and by that further elusive 
contrast which, with a touch of mystery, we very probably 
read into it-the favorable or  the unfavorable, the ominous 
or  the propitious. And this is equivalent t o  saying that there 
is no phase of experience which is pure fact, none without a 
capacity to  touch the springs of feeling and volition. There 
are some who would even reverse the order of fact and 
value, and say that-at least for  attention-there are  no 
sensations, no observations, unless there are  first concerns, 
doubts, challenges, fears, hopes, of an enquiring and anxious 
will. W e  shall be satisfied with holding the balance even; 
no fact without value, no value without fact. 
2. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT VALUE 
I t  is perhaps just because value is so difficult to  define 
that we carry on our lives, not by analyzing it nor reasoning 
about it, but by making assumptions about it. A value- 
assumption which is neither reasoned nor open to reason 
may be called a prejudice. 
W e  assume, for  example, that  it is good to live; or that 
being alive is, in general, better than not being alive. 
Schopenhauer tried to prove the contrary; the fact that  he 
made this attempt is an evidence of the prejudice in favor 
of living. 
W e  assume that  it is good to save l ife;  this is the pro- 
fessional prejudice of the physician, made into an element of 
the fundamental ethical code. This  is not a point which 
either we or  the physician attempts to  prove. 
W e  are inclined also to  assume, as if by way of a corol- 
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lary from the first prejudice, that it is good to  increase life; 
and that births are therefore always occasions for congratu- 
lation. W e  do not feel it necessary to prove this point. 
W e  assume that the several functions of normal living 
are good : among others, that the use of one’s head is a good 
thing, and therefore, if the head is for thinking and think- 
ing is for controlling nature, that it is good to control nature; 
and hence, that it is right and normal to be in a position of 
mastery toward nature and toward things, and, therefore, 
that property is a good thing and a right thing. 
Extending this idea a little bit, we find that it is good to  
extend our control throzrgh k n o d e d g e ,  as far as that con- 
trol can go. There  is nothing which we “ought” not to know; 
and nothing which we “ought” not to  control. This prejudice 
brings us into sharp opposition to  the traditional prohibition 
of the Garden of Eden:  it is good to  know good, and it is 
also good to know evil-so we think: it is good to control 
both of them by knowing them. And i f  somebody objects that 
to know evil in any thorough way is to  be evil, we are slightly 
jarred, but persist in our prejudice. 
Take  a step farther. I t  is good to  master nature; it is 
good to master oiirselves by knowledge. I t  is good to control 
life : it is good to  control the increase of life-birth control: 
it is good to  control the end of life-death control, which is 
another name for rational suicide and rational euthanasia. 
Here  our assumptions come into conflict with our earlier 
assumptions, that life is always good and its increase always 
good. When assumptions thus conflict with each other, preju- 
dice ceases to  be a sufficient guide of life, and we are com- 
pelled to begin to  do some reasoning about this field of value 
-a field so self-evident that every college student may be as- 
sumed to know what he wants, and so difficult that we can- 
not even define the term ! 
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3. DIFFICULTIES OF PROOF I N  T H E  FIELD OF VALUE 
It is just here, however, that reasoning seems especially 
futile. W h a t  can reason take hold of for a premiss? And if 
there are no certain premisses, conclusions will differ, and 
we come into the common despair of our time which accepts 
the situation that values are to  a large extent subjective. T h e  
field of taste is given over to  relativity; and just as some 
British worthy gave it out as his opinion that everyone is 
entitled, as a matter of natural right, to his own notions of 
spelling, so the common opinion today is that everyone is 
entitled to  his own notions of moral value. 
This  would constitute one emphatic difference between 
the field of science and the field of values; for in science 
the whole meaning of the steady advance is that  a corporate 
acceptance of scientific results can be anticipated, and even 
compelled, because both the ultimate data and the methods 
of reasoning from them belong to the field of verifiable 
evidence. 
Some years ago, I attempted to  teach a course in ethics 
a t  Harvard.  Midway in the course, some wild fancy moved 
me to  ask the students, in the course of an examination, to  
comment on the enterprise, under the promise of diplomatic 
immunity. A lad named Cohen wrote as follows: 
“I do  not believe that the teaching of ethics is a useful 
undertaking. T h e  trouble is that you cannot prove the im- 
portant points. You cannot prove that a man ought to  love 
his neighbor. And if you could prove it, that proof would 
not in the least help him to  do  so.” H e  added, retrospec- 
tively, “I can understand how a Jesus Christ o r  a Nietzsche 
(neither of whom tried to prove anything) could turn the 
world upside down; but I cannot see how any college profes- 
sor could turn the world upside down.” 
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This  sagacious comment went directly to  the center of 
the whole problem of thinking about values, that  is to  say, 
of rescuing them from the play of prejudice and the despair 
of subjectivity and relativity. Cohen was evidently inclined 
to give the matter up. Fo r  my part ,  I was considerably im- 
pressed, not to  say jarred, by the force of his remark. In  
reporting the matter t o  the class, I pointed out that  Cohen’s 
view, though despairing of the professor, was not wholly 
without hope for  the race: there were people who could ac- 
complish something in this field; for “turning the world 
upside down” involves securing some degree of consent to  
one’s proposed transvaluation of values. These men were 
once called prophets; nowadays we are more likely to  call 
them poets, preachers, o r  possibly fanatics. They are not 
philosophers; and they are  not scientists. It is this latter 
point which concerns us here. 
T h e  presumption is that  science ought not t o  be expected 
to help us about values. This  is not its field. It has its me‘tier, 
which is to  find the facts, wholly without regard to  their 
value. I t  is a part  of its duty to  forget values in the pursuit 
of objective truth. I t  is a par t  of its justified specialization 
to leave the estimation and use of the facts to  others. If this 
is the case there is no such thing as a “science of values’’ 
in the strict sense of the term science. 
4. SCIENTIFIC METHOD AS EXCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS O F  
VALUE 
But the most vital reason which leads science to  keep 
clear of questions of value lies in its carefully-built method 
of procedure. T h e  glory of science is in its method. This  
method may be summarized in three principles : 
First, the observation of fact. Facts must be observed 
with the utmost care to  eliminate all human preference, and 
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all intrusion of the personal equation, in the effort t o  be 
perfectly faithful to  what is given. 
Second, the discerning of law in fact, the process of in- 
duction. An individual fact, for the scientist, is commonly 
taken not as an item of narrative, but as an example of a 
type. I t  reveals some general truth about the behavior of 
things. T h e  reading of that truth is not a matter of direct 
perception, but of hypothesis ; the hypothesis needs to  be 
verified; and this verification needs to be confirmed by the 
scientific community. 
Third,  a principle about the kind of hypothesis which 
will not  be admitted. Purposes will not be considered. 
Bodies do  not fall because of any desire to  go downward; 
nor do  bodies approach each other because of any affection 
for one another, though the words attraction and repulsion 
seem to register an ancient assumption of this sort. Pur- 
poses are replaced first by “forces,” and “forces” by 
causes”; and then for the stricter scientific sense, all agen- 
cies are excluded from consideration, so that the formula- 
tion of the facts of change may be unobscured by any meta- 
physical conception. Hypotheses must be limited to  rules of 
succession among phenomena o r  events. 
This method is simplicity itself, and yet, during the time 
it was being worked out, it had to  be fought for. T h e  in- 
veterate human disposition to  read events in terms of some 
purpose, whether of God o r  of man or of the things them- 
selves, died hard :  Aristotle was authority for the pertinence 
of “final causes” to  the events of Nature. In his view all 
things were striving toward something; this inner striving 
was their life; as running water may be conceived to  strive 
toward a lower level, so for the great Greek all objects were 
tending toward what he called pure form. Modernity had to 
dispel this fancy in order t o  see in its clarity another sort 
( 6  
154 Science, Value and Religion 
of pure form, the mathematical form of the actual process of 
change, not as something aimed at, but as something actually 
realized in all natural change. 
T h e  method which was directed toward this object 
brought unity and cleanness into the world picture. Every- 
thing it relied on was public : its observed facts and inferred 
laws submitted themselves to  verification. There  was no 
guessing what the secret motives of Nature might be; there 
was no room for black arts, nor for learned doctors of hid- 
den mysteries. Humanity escaped from its own provincial- 
ism of value-judgment. Nature contains nothing disorderly, 
nothing vile-no, nor anything lovely as we count loveliness. 
T h e  mind of man spares itself the infinite possible false- 
scents involved in seeking purposes which can never be seen 
nor verified as explanations for its facts, and from which no 
predictions can ever be drawn. 
Nature seemed cleared as if  from pestilence, and the 
enthusiasm for the sharable and knowable carried the human 
mind toward an unmatched era of conquest. 
5 .  HAS SCIENCE NOTHING TO SAY ABOUT VALUES? 
Wi th  the best will in the world, however, science does en- 
counter the field of values in one or two places. 
In the first place, like every other human activity, science 
takes for granted certain values toward which its own work 
is directed. I t  assumes the value of knowledge. I t  lives on 
that prejudice-among those we have mentioned-that it is 
better to know than not to  know, and to  know things as they 
are, whether they are good facts or evil facts, o r  facts of 
mixed possibilities, as most facts are. I t  also assumes that 
its own results will be helpful to  other men in the pursuit 
of their ends, into whose value it does not enquire, though it 
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makes the general assumption that they will be decent and 
not noxious : it assumes that many of these ends will be com- 
mon goods for all mankind, such as the achievements of all 
the useful arts, medicine, engineering, and the like. And then, 
further, i t  sees its own labors as having an incidental value 
in uniting scientific workers the world over in a common 
front dealing with the common problems of mankind. Thus, 
within its own field, i t  illustrates prophetically the picture 
of a world-community in which there is a genuine fraternity, 
a high standard of integrity, and a career open to talents 
from whatever quarter of mankind. These values are, of 
course, no part  of the contents of science-they are values 
which gather round the activity of the scientific worker and 
sustain his toil and sacrifice. 
But then science encounters value in a more concrete way, 
for it comes upon man as a fact in the world, and man is a 
creature that pursues values. Science therefore is bound to  
discover the fact of prejudice. I t  reports the common prefer- 
ences of mankind: of life to death, of being on friendly 
rather than on hostile terms with one’s neighbor, of affluence 
to  poverty, and the like. In reporting these facts it does not 
pass judgment upon them. I t  deals with them with its usual 
sobriety and detachment. Even in dealing with human pas- 
sion it must make a dispassionate report, holding the ad- 
vantage of its “objectivity” ; and this making-an-object of 
our desires and emotions is doubtless a curative attitude, 
tending to  relieve us  of our infatuations, and to  achieve a 
greater dignity in our expressions of feeling. Science thus 
does us the service which any good friend does who kindly 
laughs a t  our excitements, and brings us to  a steady mind. 
I t  does for us something which Stoicism tried to  do for its 
devotees when it admonished them to  feel as coolly toward 
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their own joys and sorrows as they would toward the joys 
and sorrows of others. 
Above all, science in recognizing the facts of human valu- 
ations, refrains from using the word “ought.” As a reporter, 
it sees no meaning in judging that the facts ought to  be 
other than they are. 
In  particular, as a veracious reporter, science has to  de- 
clare that these facts of valuation are, so fa r  as i t  can dis- 
cover, local facts. They appear only in men and animals. 
They are therefore transitory: the world before the advent 
of animals showed no sign of concern about values, and if 
the animal series vanishes from the universe some day, as 
is most probable, the phenomena of valuation will vanish 
with it. T h e  “real” world, using this term for  the underlying 
course of things, as revealed in physics and astronomy, is 
devoid of interest in value and presumably of value itself. 
T h e  conclusion is drawn that  value is a subjective realm, 
or as Bertrand Russell puts it, it is our kingdom. It exists 
only for  us, and we are free to make whatever rules our 
experience may suggest for  achieving the most in quantity 
and the best in quality among what we find to be goods. 
F o r  the world outside this private scene, the story is in- 
deed a bleak one. But we have to  face it. Le t  Mr. Russell 
describe i t :  
T h a t  M a n  is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end 
they were  achieving; tha t  his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his 
loves and his beliefs, a re  but the outcome of accidental collocations of 
atoms; . . . tha t  all the labors of the  ages, all the devotion, all the inspira- 
tion, all the noonday brightness of human genius, a r e  destined to extinc- 
tion in the vast  death of the solar system, and tha t  the whole temple of 
Man’s achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the dkbris of a uni- 
verse in ruins-all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, a re  yet so 
nearly certain, tha t  no philosophy which rejects them can hope to  stand.’ 
‘Bertrand Russell, ’4 Free M u d s  Worship (Portland, Xle.: The  Mosher 
Press, 1g23), p. 6 .  
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6. SCIENCE AND CONSCIENCE 
So far,  the relation of science to  values is one of mutual 
independence. Science has no desire nor need to  interfere in 
the phenomena of human choice. But benevolent neutrality is 
a hard position to  maintain, whether in the field of public 
affairs or in the field of thought. There  is a t  least one region 
where there is danger of a clash between science and our 
value habits. T h a t  is the region we have indicated by the 
word “ought.” Science, we said, has no use for that word 
in its treatment of values. But more than that, it  is doubtful 
whether it has any use for the word a t  all, except to  record 
the fact that  some men still perversely use it. If men’s valua- 
tions are natural phenomena they are what they have to  be : 
it  is not only idle, it is perhaps mischievous, to suggest that 
they ought to  be other than they are. 
Return to  this question of loving one’s neighbor: and let 
us extend the difficulty we encountered a little while ago. 
Science, I think, would in general agree with the position of 
my student thus extended: “You cannot prove that the 
Nazis ought  to  love the Poles and the Jews as themselves.” 
If the facts are that they do not, it is wholly meaningless to  
import the word “ought” into the picture. 
Le t  us take another step. I s  there not an inherent aristoc- 
racy in nature, derived from the perspective in which each 
self views the world? W h a t  we call our “social instinct” 
leads us always to  prefer friendly relations and mutual help 
with anybody who happens along: so much belongs to  our 
original value-prejudice. But any positive concern for other 
people begins a t  the center and fades away, both with physi- 
cal distance and with distance in kind. Every person and 
every group tends to  regard those who are outside the 
warm” circle as fit to  be exploited. Hence in any large L L  
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group, such as a modern state, not connected by any ties of 
blood, the degrees of regard of man for man run through a 
wide gamut, and any democracy which assumes a relative 
equality of regard will have an uphill fight for  its life. There 
was once a religion which made this distribution of regard 
a duty. But science has no intention of usurping the functions 
of religion; and for  the purely scientific point of view, there 
is no “ought” in the premisses. 
It is enough to  say that for  science, the word “ought” 
becomes a word of dubious meaning, since “ought” always 
quarrels with the facts. T h e  tendency of science is to  re- 
interpret all propositions containing this word into proposi- 
tions concerning fact. Thus “You ought to  pay your debts” 
becomes something like this : 
Most  men find that  paying their debts is a method of behavior which 
avoids definite evils, such as friction and legal action, and secures certain 
goods, such as esteem and good feeling. They  accordingly become condi- 
tioned to this method, as a secondary habit; and are inclined to formu- 
late i t  as a law. 
Such reinterpretation of “ought” as fact is the direction 
taken by the most recent school of realists in ethics and law;  
it prides itself on its accord with the general principles of 
science. Conscience is reluctant to  accept the two proposals 
as equivalent. W e  must examine with some care how this 
difficulty arises. 
7.  SCIENTIFIC METHOD APPLIED T O  MAN 
T h e  embarrassment begins when the scientific method, so 
successful in the fields of physics and astronomy, is turned 
upon man himself. This  was bound to  happen, for  man, too, 
is a member of the natural order. And the difficulty is that 
when man becomes both the observer and the object ob- 
served, as is the case with psychology and sociology, not 
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one alone but all three of these points of method seem to 
go wrong. 
First, observation. I t  is not so easy to  observe oneself as 
to observe something else. I t  is not nearly so easy to observe 
the mind as it is to  observe the body. And if one can be said 
to observe one’s owtl mind, what he there discovers is not 
a public object-no one else can come along and certify his 
report. If Tycho Brahe in 1572 sees a new star in Cassio- 
peia, he can summon his household to  witness that his senses 
are not deceiving him. But no one can testify to  the emotions 
which arise in this trained observer when this first super- 
Nova noticed by western eyes appears as if by magic in a 
quiet neighborhood of the sky! This defect in the very 
foundations of mental science is so great that psychology 
drifts inevitably toward behaviorism. One can always ob- 
serve muscular behavior, and sometimes neural behavior ; 
and one is tempted to  disparage consciousness itself in order 
to furnish the new science with a measurable and verifiable 
object. 
Second, the discerning of law. T h e  difficulty here is in the 
question whether mental processes follow laws, as physical 
processes do. There  are reflexes and habits which seem as 
much physiological as mental ; but these are the least charac- 
teristic phases of the human mind. Feeling, imagination, 
moral conflict, decision appear to  be in some sense irregular 
and free. 
But the chief difficulty lies in the third point. If no natural 
phenomena are to  be explained by purpose, what about these 
human phenomena which certainly are purposive ? Empirical 
truth itself requires us to  report the fact of purpose where 
we find it. And i f  one can find no stable causal laws for 
human activity, the reason may be simply that the law of 
cause is replaced by the law of purpose. W e  are put to  an 
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awkward dilemma: we must either go back, in this case, on 
our hard-earned prohibition of purposive hypotheses, o r  
else on what the plain facts of the case appear to  show. W e  
must disobey principle 1 or principle 3 ! I t  is not surprising 
that in such a conflict of loyalties, some scientists of the mind 
have taken the line that purpose is a sort of subjective illu- 
sion-that cause rules the world, as well in the case of man 
as in the case of atoms. T h a t  is why many psychologists- 
some say a majority of psychologists-are interested in re- 
ducing human value-prejudices to a special kind of fact. And 
that is why the use of the word “ought” becomes for such 
thinkers a bit of outworn superstition. 
8. CONSEQUENCES OF TURNING “OUGHT” INTO FACT 
T h e  first result of this transformation is a great relief. 
Mora l  judgments are notoriously troublesome, disquieting 
to the tender conscience, tending toward harshness and 
censoriousness toward others, sources of retributive excesses 
in punishment and almost equally loathsome excesses of 
flattery. When the “ought” is merged in the soothing calm 
of universal necessity, we no longer praise or blame, regret 
or congratulate, extol as noble o r  denounce as wicked-we 
are freed from remorse for our sins and from pride for our 
good deeds. T h e  criminal is looked on with new eyes : we do 
not like what he does-that also is a fact-but, seeing that 
he too is a child of causal law, we take him to  be an organism 
out of tune, to be readjusted and healed, not punished. This 
makes for toleration and kindness. Moral indignation is a 
distressing fever which we may now lay aside; into its place 
steps the wise solicitude of the physician. 
T h e  repercussions of this change are far-reaching. I sug- 
gest that we trace some of them in the field of criminology. 
Criminology tends to  merge with psychiatry ; the criminal 
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becomes a case for  study; his heredity and environment are 
carefully enquired into ; mental and moral reactions are 
measured and tabulated; his type is classified, and treat- 
ment prescribed. H i s  whole physical being and habits are 
scrutinized; vitamin and glandular deficiencies are remedied ; 
he is brought into prime physical condition, as fa r  as his 
diathesis will allow. Meantime, with all of this he has been 
receiving a good deal of attention, much more than the aver- 
age good citizen gets;  and whether he likes it or not he 
becomes, within the small community of the prison colony, 
the well-known Mr .  So-and-so. Nothing is being said to  him 
about justice: he is not asked to  repent nor to  repay. H e  
himself may be willing to  forgive and forget the past, since 
the local environment shows no interest in the matter. H e  
is asked to  take a cooperative attitude toward society; and 
within that local and surely benevolent sample of society 
about him he may pull himself up to  do so. 
Dr.  Karl A. Menninger represents this new spirit in 
penology very well. In  his book on The Human Mind, in 
speaking of the treatment of delinquents, he explicitly re- 
jects the interest in justice. “Is typhoid fever just?” he ex- 
claims : “What  science or  scientist is interested in justice ?” 
This  dramatic question-which we can understand in the 
life of a physician whose sole business it is t o  help the pa- 
tient-pulls us up to  ask where we are. Can it be true that 
the interest in justice is outgrown? T h e  drive for the health 
of the culprit is surely the most important advance in the 
treatment of criminals in a hundred and fifty years. Is it then 
inconsistent with being also interested in justice ? 
Let  us try to  realize how far  we have come. T h e  word 
“crime” as it becomes a scientific category becomes dulled 
to our imagination: not even the favorite bad men of the 
movie strips stir us deeply. Crime appears in particular 
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deeds, not always labeled as crimes, because the heart that 
thinks crime is inventive : crime simply takes advantage of 
the ever increasing vulnerability of any advancing society, 
which has to  trust itself to  a corresponding growth of good 
will and good faith. As we become increasingly civilized it 
becomes more and more true that any life can be attacked in 
a hundred ways, any property broken into, any child taken 
from the street, any career ruined, by the man who intel- 
ligently watches his chances. W e  cannot live and grow 
socially without trusting one another, and the criminal is 
simply the man who for his own desire plants fear in the 
place of that trust, and compels society to  stand guard where 
it might be free to  advance. H e  separates his sympathy from 
his victim; he separates it still more from the advance of 
human friendliness. 
W h a t  do we want t o  do about crime? Wai t  till it  has 
happened and then correct the criminal’s hormones ? Perhaps 
they are all right! Perhaps the trouble is simply that this 
healthy and intelligent man has adopted a rational philoso- 
phy of looking out for himself and his group, in a somewhat 
unconventional way, and the devil take the rest of us. Then 
what shall we do about him? Nobody is aided by our taking 
vengeance on him. But how would it do to  express our belief 
-if we have it-that there is still a difference between right 
and wrong in this universe, and that wrong, which some 
men will always plot, is to  be denounced as wicked ? T h e  time 
to enter our protest against crime is while it is being con- 
sidered, as a clever move: and the only pertinent protest is 
to give it its right name, and attach to  it its appropriate 
feeling, that of condemnation. 
Let me not try to stir your latent wrath by setting up 
some favorite picture of my own of human meanness o r  de- 
pravity. Let you, reader, do that for yourself: is there any- 
thing men do  under the shelter of propriety-of legality 
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itself-to cheat, maim, destroy, turn hope into despair- 
anything which you would like to rebuke as evil? Then  the 
virility of your resentment may serve as your assurance that 
you are still alive! Justice, which is nothing but true judg- 
ment of behavior in respect t o  its moral quality, is the con- 
cern of every living citizen; and any man or group which 
sets itself aside from that concern is itself in need of 
medicine. 
And this bears on the doctor’s business. For the criminal 
is not cured until he regards his crime as a crime; and all 
the physical health you can induce in him will not make him 
a safe citizen until he looks a t  what he has done and hates it. 
Your pleasing forgetfulness, your skilled reconditionings, 
he knows to  be preliminary to  the main point; and he knows 
that, considered as a “case,” he is still on the animal level 
in your eyes. T h e  man who blames him, and sets a moral 
standard into his mind, does him fa r  more respect-this he 
knows-than do  you who dose him with thyroid, niacin, 
and thiamin, i f  a t  the same time you dodge the question of 
responsibility. 
On the purely scientific level there is really no definition 
of mental health o r  disease. W h a t  right has anyone to  take 
unhappiness and maladjustment as “abnormal” conditions ? 
H o w  do we know that a man who should see the actual 
conditions of life a hundred times more clearly than you 
or I do would remain “happy” and “adjusted”? Almost I 
think such a man ought to be a t  odds with the world, as 
Buddha and Christ were a t  odds with it. Those who feel the 
intolerable as intolerable may be exhibiting their point of 
genius. I am not prepared to say that all who commit suicide 
are the least perceptive of men: I know poets who have left 
life that way. Would you cure Tolstoi and Abe Lincoln of 
their inner torment a t  the wrongs they felt around them? 
Would we not do  better to  be curing our healthy and con- 
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tented masses ? Science lends no sanction to the identification 
of moral health with “adjustment.” 
It is true that there is a certain understanding of man’s 
nature, deep and percipient, which brings a certain forgive- 
ness of wrong. As one grows older, one less and less expects 
perfection and more and more realizes that human idio- 
syncrasy goes with defect. One sees that the good life is 
made not by the fortunate discovery of ideal specimens here 
and there, but by the mutual supplementation of the very 
fallible. This  is an insi’ght which must touch the edge of the 
divine pity. 
With this is often associated another form of tolerance, 
also a product of age, that of weariness and resignation. 
T h e  moral passions are exacting: as one grows older one 
learns that no human strength can fight out all the issues that 
come one’s way. No one man can change more than a frac- 
tion of the immeasurable sweep of world-events; and what 
one cannot change, one learns to be resigned to. This  is 
weariness: it is a part  of the sadness of age. 
When men speaking in the name of science suggest to  us 
that there is no “ought” but only an “is,” it is our weariness 
and not our wisdom that tends to acquiesce. T h e  distinction 
of right and wrong cannot vanish from the world until it has 
no more work to  do: that time is f a r  off. Are we becoming 
n race of old men, that the course of history is no longer 
charged with the contrast of good and evil, just and unjust? 
Is familiarity with scientific procedure, misread, making us 
as a civilization prematurely aged, resigned, morally obtuse, 
and therefore impotent? 
Let the men of science in our generation see the gravity 
of this question, which arises from the very magnitude of 
their achievement, and they will answer in no uncertain terms 
the question, W h a t  science or scientist is interested in justice? 
Science does have a power of healing, incidental to its 
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own work, which often passes unnoticed because it is un- 
claimed, but which has a definite relevance to  our enquiry. 
There  is something in the very nature of the discipline of 
scientific truth which tends to  cure morbidity and dispel the 
bent to  vice and crime. In the vast interrelated system of 
things which we call Nature, and in the relation of life t o  
that system, there is a soundness and a majesty which in- 
spire respect and even wonder ; which rebuke pettiness and 
tend to  destroy the perspectives of self-concern. 
I t  was in view of these incidental aspects of science that 
Paul Carus developed what he called the “religion of 
science.” Those were memorable words which Helen Culver 
used when she presented to  the University of Chicago a 
million dollars from the estate of Charles Hull  to realize 
President Harper’s dream of a great biological laboratory : 
I have believed tha t  moral evils would grow less as knowledge of their 
relation to physical life prevails-and tha t  science, which is knowing, 
knowing the t ruth,  is a foundation of pure religion. 
I t  is not the function of science to  aim a t  the cure of moral 
miasma; but there is reason to believe that as knowledge 
of the natural world becomes deep and proportionate, some- 
thing of wisdom and nobility steals across into the character 
of the scrupulous observer: faithful observation tends to  
become reverent observation. And this means that one can- 
not prevent, even when one tries t o  escape value, the rela- 
tions of things in their lawfulness and exactitude from taking 
on qualities over and above their factual character-such 
qualities as dignity and beauty. 
W h a t  we do have to  say in regard to such values as these 
is that they constitute no part  of the content of science. Nor  
can science be called upon to  pass judgment upon their place 
in the general scheme of human life. They are of great im- 
portance to  the scientist as a man;  they are, like other 
values, outside the body of science itself. 
